Piloting the Global Subsidy: The Impact of Subsidized Artemisinin-Based Combination Therapies Distributed through Private Drug Shops in Rural Tanzania by Sabot, Oliver J. et al.
Piloting the Global Subsidy: The Impact of Subsidized
Artemisinin-Based Combination Therapies Distributed
through Private Drug Shops in Rural Tanzania
Oliver J. Sabot
1*, Alex Mwita
2, Justin M. Cohen
3, Yahya Ipuge
4, Megumi Gordon
1, David Bishop
5,
Moses Odhiambo
6, Lorrayne Ward
7, Catherine Goodman
8
1Malaria Control Team, Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America, 2National Malaria Control Program, Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 3Center for Strategic HIV/AIDS Operations Research, Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative, Boston, Massachusetts, United
States of America, 4Tanzania Country Office, Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS Initiative, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 5Mott MacDonald Group Limited, Croydon, United
Kingdom, 6Social Research Division, Steadman Group, Nairobi, Kenya, 7Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, United States of America, 8Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Kenya Medical Research Institute/Wellcome Trust
Research Programme, Nairobi, Kenya
Abstract
Background: WHO estimates that only 3% of fever patients use recommended artemisinin-based combination therapies
(ACTs), partly reflecting their high prices in the retail sector from where many patients seek treatment. To overcome this
challenge, a global ACT subsidy has been proposed. We tested this proposal through a pilot program in rural Tanzania.
Methods/Principal Findings: Three districts were assigned to serve either as a control or to receive the subsidy plus a
package of supporting interventions. From October 2007, ACTs were sold at a 90% subsidy through the normal private
supply chain to intervention district drug shops. Data were collected at baseline and during intervention using interviews
with drug shop customers, retail audits, mystery shoppers, and audits of public and NGO facilities. The proportion of
consumers in the intervention districts purchasing ACTs rose from 1% at baseline to 44.2% one year later (p,0.001), and
was significantly higher among consumers purchasing for children under 5 than for adults (p=0.005). No change in ACT
usage was observed in the control district. Consumers paid a mean price of $0.58 for ACTs, which did not differ significantly
from the price paid for sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine, the most common alternative. Drug shops in population centers were
significantly more likely to stock ACTs than those in more remote areas (p,0.001).
Conclusions: A subsidy introduced at the top of the private sector supply chain can significantly increase usage of ACTs and
reduce their retail price to the level of common monotherapies. Additional interventions may be needed to ensure access to
ACTs in remote areas and for poorer individuals who appear to seek treatment at drug shops less frequently.
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Introduction
Artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) have become
a mainstay of malaria treatment because of their high efficacy and
their potential to delay the development of antimalarial resistance
[1,2]. Yet despite availability of substantial donor funding, the
proportion of fevers treated with ACTs remains minimal [3,4].
This partly reflects limited ACT availability outside the public
sector. In many countries, 40–60% of people seek treatment for
fever or malaria from private vendors, such as pharmacies, drug
shops and general stores [5]. However, ACTs are typically sold at
retail prices 20–40 times those of common alternatives such as
amodiaquine and sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP), restricting
their uptake by consumers, particularly in rural areas [3,6,7]. As a
result, most retail sector anti-malarial customers continue to use
older therapies for which widespread resistance has been reported
or artemisinin monotherapies, which are strongly discouraged by
the World Health Organization because their use is likely to
accelerate the development of artemisinin resistance [8,9]. Many
others purchase antipyretics only.
Anticipating this challenge, in 2004 the Institute of Medicine
recommended a global subsidy of ACTs as the best means to
achieve high coverage and prolong the efficacy of these drugs [10].
It argued that reducing the ex-factory price of ACTs to that of
common alternatives (roughly $0.05) would ensure their wide-
spread distribution through private channels and crowd out other
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 9 | e6857drugs. This concept was further developed by the Roll Back
Malaria Partnership and launched by the Board of the Global
Fund in November 2008 as the Affordable Medicines Facility-
malaria (AMFm).
The AMFm is scheduled to be launched in 11 countries within
the coming year. However, the dearth of evidence on the likely
impact of such a subsidy has hindered its design and raised
numerous concerns about investing public money in an unproven
mechanism [11]. To fill this evidence gap, we piloted the AMFm
model in two rural Tanzanian districts starting in October 2007.
This report presents the results from the pilot and assesses their
implications for implementation of the AMFm and other large-
scale subsidies.
Methods
Study design
The intervention was conducted in two rural districts of
Tanzania: Maswa in Shinyanga region and Kongwa in Dodoma
region. A third district, Shinyanga Rural in Shinyanga region,
served as a control (see Figure 1). We conducted a detailed analysis
of all districts in the country according to a range of key indicators,
including malaria endemicity, population per health facility,
employment, prevalence of private drug shops, and bed net
ownership. The selected districts were among the few roughly
comparable across all indicators, with high malaria transmission,
large numbers of private drug shops and, importantly, no malaria-
related trials (e.g., vaccines) underway. Socioeconomic status in the
three districts was below national averages as evidenced by
comparison of key assets such as housing materials, toilet facilities,
and availability of electricity [12]. The selected districts were
randomly assigned to one of the three arms in the study design:
subsidy, subsidy plus suggested retail price, and no subsidy
(control). As two of the qualified districts were adjacent,
randomization was limited so that one of the adjacent districts
served as the control.
The project centered on the distribution of ACTs at highly
subsidized prices. The project managers procured quantities of
artemether-lumefantrine (AL), the recommended first-line ACT in
Tanzania, from the manufacturer, Novartis, and sold them to a
pharmaceutical wholesaler in Dar es Salaam at an average of
$0.11 per dose, 88% below the price offered to public buyers
(private buyers are typically offered substantially higher prices).
The wholesaler, Nufaika Distributors Limited, was selected due to
its extensive distribution network and interest in selling ACTs,
among other factors, following due diligence of 10 similar
businesses. The wholesaler received no instructions other than to
sell the ACTs to drug shops in the two intervention districts
according to its standard practices. It was made clear that the
wholesaler would not be monitored or held accountable for its
pricing, stocking, or other practices.
Small drug shops, known as duka la dawa baridi (DLDB), were the
primary retail outlet for subsidized ACTs in the project. Past
studies have found that these shops are the most important
commercial source of anti-malarials in Tanzania and it is
estimated that there are more than 8,000 in operation nationwide
in rural and urban areas. Under Tanzanian law, these shops are
permitted to sell over-the-counter medicines, but not products
requiring a prescription (an exception was granted for ACTs for
this project) [13,14]. Small volumes of anti-malarials are also sold
through general stores alongside common staples, but distribution
to these outlets was not encouraged as they are not legally
permitted to sell pharmaceuticals.
AL was distributed in four weight-specific packs, in redesigned
packaging with simplified dosing instructions in the local language,
Kiswahili. ACTs distributed to Kongwa were marked with a
suggested retail price (SRP) intended to inform consumers of the
maximum amount they should pay. The SRP was set at 300, 600,
900, and 1200 Tanzanian Shillings (0.25, 0.50. 0.75. and 1 USD
respectively) for the four weight packs respectively based on an
analysis of costs in the supply chain; no SRP was included on drugs
distributed to Maswa in order to test its effect on price outcomes.
The AMFm will support countries to conduct accompanying
interventions such as training, behavior change communication
(BCC), and regulatory strengthening to facilitate the effective
distribution and use of subsidized ACTs [15]. This project
accordingly included some of those activities in the intervention
districts. Prior to the initiation of the subsidy, the Tanzania Food
and Drug Authority (TFDA) conducted a one-day training of
DLDB attendants focusing on malaria symptoms and ACT
dispensing and dosing. Population Services International con-
ducted a range of BCC activities, including local radio
advertisements, wall paintings, and themed cultural shows,
throughout the project. The activities emphasized the importance
of using ACTs and their availability in private shops, as well as
basic messages on the dangers of malaria and the importance of
prompt treatment-seeking.
Data collection
The study’s primary outcomes were the proportion of antima-
larial consumers visiting DLDB who purchased subsidized ACTs
and the price they paid for the drugs. Secondary outcomes included
the proportion of DLDB stocking the product, the socioeconomic
status of the consumer, the age of the intended patient, and ACT
distribution by public facilities during the same period.
Figure 1. Location of project districts by role in study. The red
areas denote the two intervention districts, while the green area shows
the control district.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006857.g001
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views, retail audits, mystery shoppers, and public facility audits. All
four methodologies were conducted together five times during the
project: once prior to the launch of the subsidy in August 2007 and
four times throughout the intervention in November 2007 and
March, August, and November 2008. Data were collected at all
DLDB and public facilities in the three districts. DLDB were
initially identified through TFDA records, with unregistered shops
captured through discussions with local informants and systematic
physical reconnaissance throughout each district. Geographical
positions of all shops were recorded using hand-held GPS units
(Garmin Etrex).
For the exit interviews, data collectors positioned themselves
near a DLDB and remained there for the full business day. All
customers emerging were asked to answer a short questionnaire on
the products bought, and the brand of the product was visually
verified. To assess the customers’ socio-economic status, inter-
viewees were asked a series of questions about their household
assets from the 2003–04 Tanzania HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey.
DLDB retail audits were conducted twice during every data
collection period, at a four week interval. Collectors recorded the
volume of all anti-malarial stocks present. A short questionnaire was
also administered to the owner or attendant to determine the amount
of each product newly purchased and disposed of (e.g., due to expiry
or damage) during the previous four weeks. Stock levels were then
compared between the two audits and purchases and disposals
subtracted to determine the volume of sales during that period.
DLDB pricing and dispensing practices were also observed by
having collectors visit each shop once per survey posing as a
consumer seeking malaria treatment. Two such ‘‘mystery
shopper’’ scenarios were employed – adults purchasing for
themselves and purchasing for a nine-month old child at home
with malaria symptoms. Data collectors also visited all public and
non-governmental organization (NGO) health facilities in each
survey period to review ACT stocks and dispensing records.
In this paper we focus primarily on data from the baseline in
August 2007 and follow-up in August 2008 because of potential
seasonal variation in malaria transmission and treatment seeking.
To enable robust analysis of the impact of the SRP, pricing data
are pooled across intervention surveys and compared to the
baseline. A full set of results for all data collection periods is
available at http://www.cshor.org/TanzaniaPilotData.xls.
Data analysis
To assess geographical variation in outcomes, the competition
level of all DLDB was calculated using the fixed radius approach
[16]. The competitive space of each DLDB was defined as 1
kilometer and each shop was assigned to a competition index
category between 0 and 5 based on the number of other DLDB
within that radius.
Exit interviewees were allocated to wealth quintiles using the
asset weights and quintile break-points generated through
principal components analysis of 53 variables from the 2003–
2004 HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey [17]. Due to operational
challenges associated with administering asset ownership questions
at shops (as opposed to at household level as is typical), several
variables from the original survey were not captured, including
additional forms of household lighting, water source, and land
ownership status. Asset weights and national quintiles were
therefore calculated using only those variables captured in the
exit interviews.
To enable comparison of price across products, the exact
number of pills purchased (syrups and injectables were excluded)
by interviewees or mystery shoppers was recorded and the price
paid for a full appropriate dose for the intended patient then
extrapolated using the standard dosing schedule according to
Tanzania national treatment guidelines or product registration
with the TFDA [18]. Similarly, to compare sales across products,
we converted the total number of pills sold to adult equivalent
doses based on the recommended dosing.
Survey data were analyzed using SPSS v.14/16 (Chicago,
Illinois) and SAS v.9.1 (Cary, NC), and GPS data using MapInfo
v.7.8 (Troy, New York). Proportions were compared using chi-
square tests. Student t-tests were used to compare means and the
Satterthwaite t-test was used when variances were significantly
unequal. A repeated measures multivariate regression model was
used to compare differences in purchase price while controlling for
potentially confounding factors and adjusting for clustering of
multiple purchases in the same shops.
Ethical Considerations
As a pilot project of the Tanzania Ministry of Health and Social
Welfare to prepare for a national program, the interventions were
developed with the Tanzania Food and Drug Authority and
National Malaria Control Program according to the policies and
guidelines of the Ministry and approved by the Chief Medical
Officer accordingly. No additional interventions were added as
part of the subsequent evaluation. Oral informed consent was
obtained from all consumers emerging from drug shops as well as
from drug shop owners prior to the administration of retail audits.
No ethnic or individual identifying information was captured. This
study complied with the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki.
Results
Table 1 summarizes the observations recorded for each method-
ology. The total number of DLDB audited increased from 200 in
August 2007 to 216 in August 2008 due to the opening of new
shops, with 30 (13%) and 39 (15%) additional shops closed or
refusing to participate at these two time periods respectively. A
similar number of all shops observed were in areas of high
competition (36% and 38% in categories 4 and 5 in August 2007
and August 2008 respectively) as in areas of low competition (35%
in categories 0 and 1 in both periods). High competition DLDB
were located in population centers while those in low competition
categories were 20–25 km from major roads. The majority of
consumers interviewed in all districts in August 2007 and August
2008 were from the two least poor SES quintiles (59% and 68%
respectively).
Stocking
There was a pronounced increase in the proportion of shops
stocking ACTs in the intervention districts, from 0/133 in August
2007 to 109/151 (72.2%) in August 2008 (p,0.001). Shops
stocking ACT in the control district changed negligibly from 1/67
(1%) to 0/65 over the same period. Shops with two or more other
shops in their competition radius were significantly more likely to
stock ACTs in August 2008 (82/101, 81.2%) than those with 0 or
1 competitor (27/50, 54.0%; p,0.001). By comparison, stocking
of some other common anti-malarials was more consistent across
competition categories: 75/101 (74.3%) of shops in category 2 and
above and 34/50 (68.0%) in categories 0 and 1 stocked
amodiaquine, a non-significant difference.
Pricing
Interviewed consumers paid a mean price of $0.58 for all ACTs
(SD=$0.28) during the study period (Figure 2). Consumers
purchasing ACTs for children under 5 paid significantly less than
Impact of Subsidized ACTs
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(SD=$0.19) and $0.70 (SD=$0.28) respectively (p,0.001).
Overall, the average price paid for ACTs for adults did not differ
significantly from expenditures on SP ($0.67, SD=$0.34), but was
significantly higher than for amodiaquine ($0.48, SD=$0.27;
p,0.001). The mean price paid for ACTs for children under 5
was significantly less than for both SP ($0.51, SD=$0.28;
p=0.001) and AQ ($0.86, SD=$0.30; p,0.001). Controlling
for the age of the intended recipient, the district in which the drug
was purchased, and clustering of multiple purchases in shops, the
price paid for ACTs did not vary significantly by either the SES
quintile of the consumer or the competition category of the shop.
Consumers paid significantly more for the three largest of the
four AL weight packs in Kongwa than in Maswa (all p,0.001),
while no significant difference was observed for the lowest (5–
15 kg) dose. In Kongwa, the mean price paid for two AL doses,
infant (5–15 kg) at $0.34 (SD=$0.24; p,0.001) and child (15–
25 kg) at $0.55 (SD=$0.15; p=0.034), were significantly higher
than the SRP. Mean prices did not differ significantly from the
SRP for the other two doses.
Uptake and Sales
Table 2 presents exit interview data on uptake for AL,
artemisinin monotherapy, and the two other most commonly
purchased antimalarials, amodiaquine and SP. The proportion of
anti-malarial consumers in the intervention districts who pur-
chased ACTs increased strikingly during the project, from 4/399
(1.0%) in August 2007 to 201/455 (44.2%) in August 2008
(p,0.001). This proportion subsequently declined insignificantly
to 227/572 (39.7%) in November 2008. Over the same period,
purchases of SP and amodiaquine in the intervention districts
declined significantly, from 232/399 (58.2%) to 163/455 (35.8%;
p,0.001) and 146/399 (36.6%) to 75/455 (16.5%; p,0.001)
respectively. Use of artemisinin monotherapies remained negligi-
ble throughout the study.
Purchases by mystery shoppers followed a similar trend, with
the proportion of shoppers offered ACTs in intervention districts
rising from 6/133 (4.5%) to 83/146 (56.9%; p,0.001) and those
offered SP declining from 83/133 (62.4%) to 38/146 (26.0%;
p,0.001). When restricted to only shops stocking ACTs, the
proportion of interviewed consumers and mystery shoppers buying
ACTs was significantly higher than when all shops were included:
55.5% v. 44.2% (p=0.001) and from 76.4% v. 56.9% (p=0.001)
respectively. No change in ACT purchasing was observed in the
control district.
In August 2008, 44/83 (53.0%) of consumers purchasing anti-
malarials for a child under 5 bought ACTs compared to 104/291
(35.7%) of those purchasing for an adult (p=0.005). There was no
correlation between the SES of the consumer and the likelihood of
buying ACTs, with ACTs comprising 44.4% of purchases by
consumers in the poorest two quintiles (n=45) compared to 42.4%
by those in the least poor quintiles (n=328). Similarly, there was
no significant difference in the proportion of consumers buying
ACTs between high and low competition stores.
Retail audits showed that 9,786 adult equivalent doses of ACTs
(60.3% of all adult equivalent anti-malarial doses) were sold by
DLDB in a 4-week period in July/August 2008, while ACT sales in
the control district remained negligible (see Figure 3). Overall
distribution of ACTs in the intervention districts, including
dispensing from public and NGO facilities, increased 62% between
November 2007 (the first collection following intervention) and
August 2008 from 30,946 to 69,068 doses, with ACTs distributed
through the private sector accounting for 38% of that growth.
Discussion
The introduction of subsidized ACTs resulted in a rapid and
pronounced increase in the proportion of people accessing ACTs
from private shops from close to zero to 44% after one year.
Distribution of ACTs through the public sector rose at the same
time, indicating that the intervention contributed to increases in
Table 1. Recorded observations by methodology, characteristic, and district, August 2007 and August 2008.
August 2007 August 2008
Maswa Kongwa Control Maswa Kongwa Control
DLDB Audited 73 60 67 83 68 65
Comp Index 0 12 7 15 13 20 14
Comp Index 1 12 15 9 10 7 12
Comp Index 2–3 21 18 20 28 18 13
Comp Index 4–5 3 5 6 0 10 18
Comp Index 5+ 25 15 17 32 13 8
Exit Interviewees 346 53 181 167 288 118
Buying for Ages 16+ 275 37 125 79 212 76
Buying for Ages 5–16 28 7 10 39 42 10
Buying for Ages,5 43 9 46 49 34 32
SES Quintile 1 (poorest) 3 4 21 8 12 4
SES Quintile 2 27 7 40 16 9 8
SES Quintile 3 62 8 66 32 50 9
SES Quintile 4 137 26 45 56 112 52
SES Quintile 5 (least poor) 117 8 9 55 105 45
Mystery Shoppers 73 60 67 81 65 65
Public/NGO facilities audited 38 33 34 35 36 36
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006857.t001
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August 2007 August 2008
Maswa Kongwa
Total Intervention
Districts
Control
District Maswa Kongwa
Total Intervention
Districts
Control
District
Adults (ages 16+)
Antimalarial purchases of which: 275 37 312 125 79 212 291 76
ACT 3 (1%) 1 (3%) 4 (1%) 0 (0%) 38 (48%) 66 (31%) 104 (35%) 0 (0%)
SP 187 (68%) 26 (70%) 213 (68%) 78 (62%) 30 (38%) 118 (56%) 148 (51%) 63 (83%)
AQ 71 (26%) 10 (27%) 81 (26%) 41 (33%) 8 (10%) 23 (11%) 31 (11%) 12 (16%)
Children (ages,5)
Antimalarial purchases of which: 37 6 43 35 49 34 83 32
ACT 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 20 (41%) 24 (71%) 44 (53%) 2 (6%)
SP 1 (3%) 2 (33%) 3 (7%) 3 (9%) 1 (2%) 2 (6%) 3 (4%) 3 (9%)
AQ 35 (95%) 4 (67%) 39 (91%) 32 (91%) 22 (45%) 8 (24%) 30 (36%) 22 (69%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006857.t002
Figure 2. Price paid for ACTs and most common alternative anti-malarials by interviewed consumers. Prices of subsidized ACTs and the
most commonly purchased alternative anti-malarial – amodiaquine (AQ) or sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) – observed in the two intervention
districts between November 2007 and November 2008 are displayed by intervention district and age of intended recipient. The thick blue line
denotes the median and the red X the mean, with the surrounding box delineating the interquartile range (IQR). The lines extending from each box
mark 1.5 times the IQR, with dots showing outliers that do not fall within this range.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006857.g002
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increases in ACT usage at DLDB were by those seeking treatment
for children under 5, the group at the greatest risk of malaria
mortality. However, as other studies have found, purchases at
DLDB for children under 5 were modestly underrepresented
compared to the estimated fever incidence for this age group [19].
The rise in ACT usage appears to have crowded out the use of
some sub-optimal therapies such as SP and AQ, although a
substantial number of consumers continued to purchase these
drugs at the end of the study. There was no significant change in
ACT uptake during the last 3 months of the study, but this does
not suggest that a long-term plateau in ACT purchasing had been
reached. The intervention is targeting a fundamental shift in the
market for anti-malarials, which will require years to fully realize.
As shown in other studies, poorer individuals appear to have
sought treatment for malaria at DLDB substantially less frequently
than wealthier ones, suggesting that additional interventions may
be needed to increase ACT access among this population [20].
The subsidy had the intended effect of reducing the retail price
of ACTs to levels similar to commonly used alternatives. On
average, consumers paid 93% less than ACT prices regularly
observed in private outlets in rural and urban areas across
Tanzania [21]. Contrary to competition theory and common
concern about the AMFm, consumers did not pay significantly
more for ACTs at more remote shops facing less competition [16].
These results also contradict another common critique of large-
scale ACT subsidies: that businesses would apply excessive mark-
ups thereby minimizing the benefit to consumers. There were
almost no instances of such ‘‘price gouging,’’ with 86% of all
purchases within $0.08 of the SRP for the dose and the highest
price paid still 81% below typical ACT prices in Tanzanian shops.
The SRP appears to have had the opposite of the intended effect,
artificiallyinflatingpricesinKongwaabovethosedeterminedbythe
market in Maswa. The SRP levels were determined based on
estimated costs and profit margins in the private anti-malarial
supply chain derived from interviews with more than 50 businesses.
That those levels were substantially above the retail market prices
suggests that an SRP should be used with caution, based on a more
detailed understanding of pricing practices and only in cases where
unreasonable profit margins are being charged.
Figure 3. Stocking and sales of subsidized ACTs at drug shops in intervention districts. All duka la dawa baridi (DLDB) in Maswa (top) and
Kongwa (bottom) districts are mapped as either white (ACTs not in stock at time of survey) or black (ACTs in stock) circles. Data is shown at baseline
(August ’07) and two periods during implementation (November ’07 and August ’08). Districts are divided into 10 km
2 squares, with the total volume
of adult equivalent doses of ACTs sold in that area over the preceding four weeks shown by the color of shading as follows: Tan=1 to 50 doses sold;
Orange=51 to 250 doses; Light red=251 to 500 doses; and Dark red=501 to 10,000 doses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006857.g003
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intervention, it was skewed towards shops in towns and other
population centers. When analysis was restricted to those shops
stocking ACTs, purchases of the drug increased markedly,
indicating that availability may have served as a major limitation
on overall uptake. Many shopkeepers described high consumer
demand for ACTs but expressed frustration at problems in
obtaining the drugs. This suggests that addressing supply chain
issues should be a central focus of large-scale subsidy plans. In
particular, since wholesalers often lack an inherent financial
incentive to distribute to remote outlets, public sector means of
creating such incentives, such as providing a substantial rebate to
wholesalers for achieving certain coverage levels in remote areas,
should be explored [22].
Caution should be used in directly applying these findings to
other settings. Socioeconomic factors, malaria treatment-seeking
behavior, and the structure of private supply chains all vary widely
between and within countries [5]. This study operated through
only one wholesaler and one type of retail outlet, while national-
scale subsidies will employ multiple of both. And although
concerted measures were put in place to limit the Hawthorne
Effect, it is possible that businesses and consumers were influenced
by the presence of the study team.
Nevertheless, these results are cause for cautious optimism that
subsidies applied at the top of the private supply chain can lead to
rapid and dramatic increases in ACT usage. Consumer demand
for ACTs was high and average retail prices remained low due to
businesses applying modest mark-ups on the product, similar to
those for older drugs such as SP and amodiaquine. The study also
highlights key areas for further research on this topic. Overall
changes in ACT coverage and treatment-seeking behavior,
including among different SES groups, should be robustly assessed
through studies collecting household level data. Moreover, the use
of privately distributed ACTs for non-malarious fevers and
opportunities for effectively introducing diagnosis into the private
sector should be explored.
However, the need for further research should not delay
implementation. No amount of piloting will fully recreate the
conditions of a national or global subsidy, and some ‘‘learning by
doing’’ will be inevitable. Our findings should provide sufficient
confidence for large-scale implementation of the subsidy model as
a central part of the global effort to increase ACT access from
current dismal levels towards the Roll Back Malaria target of 80%
of patients by the end of 2010. [6]
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